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opinion in Hicks indicates that the court, though appearing to approve
the decision in Biggs and to recognize the policy behind section 8-56 upon
which that decision was based, either overlooked or dismissed the fact
that the policy behind section 50-10 is the same and should be controlling.
The court turned from any discussion of policy, distinguished the two
statutes on the fact that they are worded differently, 8 and rested its
holding upon the quotation from Perkins0 while ignoring completely
the policy that Justice Ruffin found so important to that decision.
The effect of Hicks is that section 50-10 is extended beyond its
policy-oriented base. Such an extension can lead only to future injustice
and underhanded methods of procuring "competent" testimony. The insignificance of collusion in North Carolina divorce law 40 may indicate
the advisability of repeal of both this statute and its counterpart in
section 8-56. At least, Hicks suggests the need for a closer look by both
the legislature and the court.
JAMES LEE DAVIS

Federal Jurisdiction-Federal Court Intervention as Protection
Against Illegal Police Harassment
"I found there's no correlation between a clean-shaven cheek and
morality-and there's no correlation between long hair and immorality."1 The words might well have been those of the district judge
who in the recent case of Wheeler v. Goodnwn2 observed:
Hippies, like more conventional householders, are entitled to the protection of the constitution, and the court would be remiss if it allowed
policy against collusion or the opportunity for collusion in divorce actions" was not
violated.
Historically, preservation of family harmony has also been an important policy
consideration of the court. There is no indication, however, that this policy has
valid application to the statutory disability under consideration. Certainly, if the
facts are as the husband contended, the parties in Hicks are beyond reconciliation.
275 N.C. at 378, 167 S.E.2d at 766.
s' See text at note 20 supra. The court also relied partially upon Becker v.
Becker, 262 N.C. 685, 138 S.E.2d 507 (1964), a case presenting a similar factual
situation, in which the testimony was summarily excluded without any discussion of
policy.
,' See note 25 supra.
1NEwswEEK, Sept. 1, 1969, at 22A, quoting Beverly Hills, California, police
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the length of a man's hair or the thinness of his purse to affect the
measure of his civil rights 3
In Wheeler, the "hippie" plaintiffs were living in a rented house in
Charlotte, North Carolina. Over a short period of time, members of the
Charlotte police force made several searches both of the house and of
its occupants. The police also seized from the house several items that
were not returned. Finally, on January 9, 1969, after hearing "profane
talk," several police officers entered and arrested the persons within
for vagrancy. In district criminal court the next day, a nolle prosequi
with leave was taken by the prosecution. Both before and after this incident, the police warned visitors and occupants of the house to leave and
not to return. These practices continued after the vagrancy charges until,
aided by police presence, the owner of the house evicted the "hippies."
The "hippies" then brought an action as plaintiffs in federal court
for injunctive and other relief against the Charlotte Police Department.
The court found that the police had violated the plaintiffs' first amendment rights of free expression and free association and that they had
conducted several illegal searches and seizures in violation of the fourth
amendment.4 The court issued a broad injunction, prohibiting the defendant police from investigating, detaining, or prosecuting the plaintiffs
or any other persons under the North Carolina vagrancy statute; from
conducting any unreasonable searches and seizures; and from harassing
the plaintiffs in a manner to discourage them from the exercise of their
first amendment rights. Finally, the court ordered that a three-judge
district court be convened to consider the constitutionality of the North
Carolina vagrancy statute.5
Federal jurisdiction was based upon the alleged deprivation of the
plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The plaintiffs asserted that the general
police harrassment, and specifically the vagrancy violation if the statute
be unconstitutional, deprived them of due process of law. Relief was
sought under section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code 6 and
3

Id. at 942.
lId. at 937-41.
'Id. at 942-44. On November 14, 1969, while this note was in the process of
publication, the three-judge district court ruled the North Carolina vagrancy
statute unconstitutional on the grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. Raleigh
News & Observer, Nov. 15, 1969, at 1, col. 1-4.
642 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction
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the corresponding jurisdictional statute, section 1343 of Title 28 of the
United States Code.7 These provisions are the basis for federal jurisdiction and relief as to both statutory and non-statutory problems in
Wheeler." The statutory problems, which concern the alleged unconstitutionality of the state vagrancy statute and its application against the
plaintiffs, are within the scope of section 1983 since the vagrancy
statute, if unconstitutional, would under color of state law deprive the
plaintiffs of due process. 9 The non-statutory problems, which concern
the police harassment and the infringements of first and fourth amendment rights exclusive of the application of the vagrancy statute, also
state a claim for relief under section 1983 because the "under color of"
wording has been held to encompass even unconstitutional police actions
in excess of legal authority.'
In spite of the proper invocation of federal jurisdiction, certain restraints upon its exercise can be examined in the context of Wheeler.
These restrictions, both judicial and statutory, are an effort to control
areas of conflict between state and federal courts and to encourage a harmonious relationship between the two court systems. The restrictions include (1) the requirement that in some circumstances original federal
jurisdiction be exercised by three judges rather than one, (2) the prohibition on injunction of a pending state proceeding, and (3) the judicial
1
concept of abstention as modified by Dombrowski v. Pfister."
The first restriction concerns the action of the single federal judge in
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
(Emphasis added.)
For a discussion of the "minority group" test under the statute, see Note, Federal
Iurisdictio-Expansionof the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 47 N.C.L. R.. 922

(1969).

"28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964), provides in part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any
Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any
Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including
the right to vote.
8298 F. Supp. at 940.
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
1
oMonroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
1380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Wheeler in issuing an injunction as relief for both statutory and nonstatutory problems.'" The judge in enjoining enforcement of the vagrancy statute may have exceeded his powers because it appears that he
was authorized only to issue a temporary restraining order to prevent
irreparable injury.3 The injunction issued against enforcement of the
statute may have, in fact, been relief on the merits and solely within the
province of the three-judge district court. The United States Supreme
Court has pointed out:
When an application for a statutory three-judge court is addressed to
a district court, the court's inquiry is appropriately limited to determining whether the constitutional question raised is substantial,
whether the complaint at least formally alleges a basis for equitable
relief, and whether the case presented otherwise comes within the requirements of the three-judge statute. Those criteria were assuredly
met here, and the applicable jurisdictional statute therefore made it
impermissible for a single judge to decide the merits of the case, either
by granting or withholding relief. 14
There would, of course, be no similar bar to the single judge's issuing
an injunction on the merits of the non-statutory claims because no threejudge court was required to decide them.
Two further restrictions on the exercise of federal jurisdiction remain
to be considered regardless of whether an injunction or a temporary restraining order was appropriate. The first is whether federal relief should
be granted to stop "pending" state proceedings in view of the antiinjunction statute ;15 the second whether federal relief should be withheld
or suspended because of the abstention doctrine.'
The court in Wheeler in discussing the two above restrictions did not
distinguish between the statutory and non-statutory problems. It also appears to have concluded that the test for both the anti-injunction statute
and abstention doctrine is the same-the seriousness on the merits of the
12298 F. Supp. at 942.
1828 U.S.C. § 2284(3) (1964); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 50, at 166
(1963).
" Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 (1962)
(per curiam) (footnote omitted).
1528 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964), provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate
its judgments. (emphasis added)
"0See Douglas v. City of Jeannete, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Railroad Comm'n
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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In fact, closer
state deprivations of substantive constitutional rights.
analysis reveals that the statutory and non-statutory problems should
have been considered separately and that the tests for the two restrictions
on jurisdiction are different and distinguishable.
Since there was no state proceeding concerning the alleged unconstitutional infringements exclusive of the vagrancy statute, the non-statutory,
problems created no restriction under the anti-injunction statute on the
federal court's issuance of an injunction. There also was no reason for
application of the abstention doctrine since the sole issues involved federal
constitutional questions; state constitutional or legal provisions, if there
were any, were clear.' 8
In considering the statutory questions, the single judge could have
concluded that because only a temporary restraining order should be issued, the anti-injunction statute and abstention doctrine were inapplicable. The purpose of the temporary restraining order would have
been to protect the plaintiffs from irreparable injury until the three-judge
court could act on a request for an injunction. By discussing the two
restrictions on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, the judge anticipated
a three-judge court and to some extent matters within its discretion. 0
On the other hand, he could have taken the position that a restraining
order should not be issued in respect to the statutory problems if the antiinjunction statute were a bar or if the three-judge court would properly
abstain on the merits. This supposition will be a basis for a further discussion of Wheeler.
Plaintiff's central contention concerning the North Carolina vagrancy
statute20 was that it should be held unconstitutional for both vagueness
17298 F. Supp. at 940.
18
See Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 690-91 (1963). North Carolina has
adopted the UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-253
to -267 (1953). Even though relief might have been sought in state courts for the
constitutional infringements, abstention was nevertheless improper because the
purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to provide a federal forum. McNeese v. Board
of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1963).
" It appears the single judge could not abstain on the merits because a threejudge district court was required to determine the constitutionality of the
vagrancy statute. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713,
715 (1962) (per curiam). See also Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in
Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1964).
2
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-336 (1953) provides:
If any person shall come within any of the following classes, he shall be
deemed a vagrant...
1. Persons wandering or strolling about in idleness who are able to work
and have no property to support them.
2. Persons leading an idle, immoral or profligate life, who have no property to support them and who are able to work and do not work.
3. All persons able to work having no property to support them and who
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and overbreath. The state supreme court has not ruled on the constitutional issue in cases brought under the present statute,2 1 but recent decisions of other courts suggest that it cannot withstand constitutional attack. Vagueness should refer to the lack of certainty in meaning, overbreath to the extent of the conduct made criminal by the statute. However,
the term "vagueness" has to some extent been adopted to convey both
meanings. If the North Carolina statute is vague, it is vague not because
of lack of clarity but because it, in fact, makes "conduct" that should not
be subject to such sanctions criminal. Therefore, the statute's constitutionality is open to attack as a violation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment by an overreaching of the police power of the
state.23
Since the plaintiffs were prosecuted under the vagrancy statute, the
initial problem of the restriction of the federal anti-injunction statute24
is whether it would bar the exercise of federal jurisdiction. This statute
would not apply if section 1983, under which the plaintiffs brought their
action, were an express exception to it. Since the wording of section
1983 creates only broad equity jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals for the
have not some visible and known means of a fair, honest, and reputable
livelihood.
4. Persons having a fixed abode who have no visible property to support
them and who live by stealing or by trading in, bartering for or buying
stolen property.
5. Professional gamblers living in idleness.
6. All able-bodied men having no other visible means of support who shall
live in idleness upon the wages or earnings of their mother, wife, or minor
children, except of male children over eighteen years old.
7. Keepers and inmates of bawdy-houses, assignation houses, lewd and disorderly houses, and other places where illegal sexual intercourse is
habitually carried on: Provided, that nothing here is intended or shall
be construed as abolishing the crime of keeping a bawdy-house, or
lessening the punishment by law for such crime.
21 State v. Millner, 240 N.C. 602, 83- S.E.2d 546 (1954) ; State v. Harris, 229

N.C. 413, 50 S.E.2d 1 (1948); State v. Oldham, 224 N.C. 415, 30 S.E.2d 318
(1944); State v. Walker, 179 N.C. 730, 102 S.E. 404 (1920); State v. Price,
175 N.C. 804, 95 S.E. 478 (1918).

"Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897 (D. Colo. 1969) (three-judge court);

Smith v. Hill, 285 F. Supp. 556 (E.D.N.C. 1968) (municipal vagrancy ordinance);

Baker v. Bindner, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967) (three-judge court);
Alegata v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 287, 231 N.E.2d 201 (1967); Fenster v.
Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 309, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967). In each of
these
2 2 cases a vagrancy statute or ordinance was held unconstitutional.
Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 426, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967).
24 The background of the anti-injunction statute was fully discussed in Toucey
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 3.14 U.S. 118, 129-34 (1941), where Justice Frankfurter outlined the exceptions to the statute existing at that time. The present
version of the anti-injunction statute, adopted in 1948 to overturn the result in
Toucey, allows the federal courts to protect their judgments by enjoining relitigation in state courts. C. WRIGHT, EDERAL CouRTs § 47, at 154-55 (1963).
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Fourth Circuit has held that no such express exception can be implied."
Nevertheless, the history and purpose of section 1983 (though not expressed in it) suggest strongly that it was intended as an exception, 20 and
7
another circuit has so held.
It is not surprising that the court in Wheeler did not attempt to resolve the question of whether section 1983 is an exception to the antiinjunction statute. Recently the United States Supreme Court has expressly declined to decide this issue."' The Court did strongly suggest
that the anti-injunction statute applies only if state proceedings are begun
prior to the filing of the federal complaint. The priority for adjudication
is set by the "first in time" principle rather than by the type or nature
of the rights and statutory questions to be resolved.
Thus the precise issue in Wheeler is whether a nolle prosequi with
leave is a "state proceeding" within the meaning of the anti-injunction
statute. 9 It is clear that the state proceedings commenced prior to the
federal action and that the prosecutor decided to delay indefinitely while
controlling whether there would ever be a state trial on the vagrancy
charges. The federal court, in deciding if there was "state proceeding"
"Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 586-96 (4th Cir. 1964). Wheeler
cited this case for its comprehensive review of the issue. 298 F. Supp. at 940.
"For a discussion of the history and purpose of section 1983, suggesting it
should be an exception to the anti-injunction statute, see Boyer, Federal Injunctive Relief: A Counterpoise Against the Use of State Criminal ProsecutionsDesigned to Deter the Exercise of Preferred ConstitutionalRights, 13 How. L.J. 51,
88-93 (1967); Note, Dombrowski Remedy-Federal Injunctions Against State
Court Proceedings Violative of Constitutional Rights, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 92,
97-125 (1966).
2" Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119
(3d Cir. 1950). Contra, Smith v. Village of Lansing, 241 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1957); Sexton v. Barry, 233 F.2d 220
(6th Cir. 1956).
" The Court declined to decide the issue even though the three-judge district
court held the anti-injunction statute a bar to relief. Cameron v. Johnson, 390
U.S. 611, 613-14 n.3 (1968), aff'g on other grounds 262 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Miss.
1966).
" Possibly the use of nolle prosequi with leave was a violation of plaintiffs'
sixth amendment right to a speedy trial, but such a determination is uncertain.
There is no indication in Wheeler that plaintiffs (defendants in the vagrancy action) demanded a speedy trial nor is it certain whether a demand is necessary to
prevent a waiver. Clearly the right to a speedy trial is violated when the defendant objects to a nolle prosequi with leave and demands a trial. However,
even without a demand, there may be a violation of the right since the device
allows the prosecutor to delay the trial indefinitely without justification and without defendant's affirmative assent. K-lopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213
(1967), noted in 46 N.C.L. REv.387 (1968), rev'g State v. Klopfer, 266 N.C. 349,
145 S.E.2d 909 (1966), noted in 44 N.C.L. R-v. 1126 (1966). See also State v.
Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 167 S.E.2d 274 (1969), noted in Note, Criminal Procedure-The Potential Defendant's Right to a Speedy Trial, 48 N.C.L. REv.

121 (1969).
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within the protection of the anti-injunction statute, could have distinguished between a normal good-faith delay of the state criminal prosecution and a delay calculated to threaten or harassthe plaintiffs rather than
resolve the actual charges. Of course, the federal courts should not attempt to evaluate ordinary delays in state criminal prosecutions, but the
delay here was no ordinary one. It showed the intention of the prosecution to avoid trial and a state constitutional test of the vagrancy statute.
So in Wheeler, the federal judge could have applied a test of practical considerations"0 and thus interpreted the state action as "threatened" rather
than "pending." The anti-injunction statute based on the Dombrowski
implication 1 could be construed as applicable to a state proceeding that
was progressing, but not to one where eventual action was merely threatened owing to the peculiar nature of the nolle prosequi with leave.
The final restriction on the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the abstention doctrine, which requires a federal court to decline to adjudicate
a constitutional issue if a subsequent state court ruling on threshold
state law could make the federal adjudication superfluous.3" This doctrine
may be invoked in actions in which a federal injunction is sought against
possible state criminal prosecutions. 3 The federal courts should interfere
in such cases only where abstention is improper and there is clear and
imminent irreparable injury.3 4
Whether a federal court must abstain in a given situation depends
upon several factors, including the following: (1) the probability of a
future constitutional construction of the statute in question by the state
courts; (2) the federal court's evaluation of the alleged vagueness or
overbreath of the statute; (3) the statute's effect on its face on first
amendment rights; and (4) bad faith enforcement of the statute by the
state.3 5 Thus the showing of irreparable injury to avoid abstention depends upon the nature and application of the state statute involved. The
O"As a practical consideration, it is recognized that federal interference with
pending prosecutions would cause greater abrasion between federal and state
courts than interference with threatened prosecutions." Boyer, supra note 26, at
96.
= Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965).
82Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
The primary
reasons for the doctrine are (1) to avoid a premature decision of a constitutional
question, (2) to avoid unnecessary conflict with the states, which have the primary
responsibility for deciding the status of their own laws, and (3) to promote federal
judicial economy. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 169 (1963).

" Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 162 (1943).
"Id.
at 163-64.
5

" See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 620-21 (1968); Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
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mere possibility that the state courts may not correctly determine its constitutionality is not a sufficient showing of irreparable injury to justify
the issuance of a federal injunction. 0 On the other hand, a showing that
defense of the criminal charges in state court will not adequately protect
the constitutional right of freedom of expression is sufficient. 7 For example in Dombrowski, where the state had passed a broad statute to control subversive activities and propaganda, the Supreme Court found that
even a defense to a criminal prosecution would not adequately protect
freedom of expression because of the impairment of that right during the
long period of trial and ultimate appellate review.'8 In making such a
determination, the Court will almost certainly accord the first amendment right of freedom of association the same level of importance as freedom of expression.3 9
The North Carolina vagrancy statute on its face does not threaten
freedom of expression or association; rather that threat derives from its
selective application against groups unpopular with the police.40 Indeed,
the possibility of such selective enforcement may in itself be a significant
threat to first amendment freedom.4" The criteria for determining selective enforcement, of course, necessitate an evaluation of the state's good
faith in applying the statute. If the statute has been invoked by the state
in bad faith, the resulting harassment may be sufficient to show irreparable
42
injury
The single factor of bad faith application of a statute is probably not
alone sufficient to preclude abstention. The decision in Cameron v.
"8Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 621 (1968) ; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
"Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
88Id.

The Court emphasized the importance of the right of association in NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). While the Wheeler plaintiffs as a group were
not engaged in activity for an important political or social purpose, it seems clear
that the first amendment rights of freedom of expression and association would
fully extend to them even if the purpose of their association were, in terms of community norms, antisocial or anti-cultural.
,' The pattern of police behavior suggests apprehension that the "hippie house"
would be the center of some criminal activity. However, police assumptions cannot serve as a basis for the forfeiture of constitutional rights. Likewise, deprivations of constitutional rights cannot be justified as "social control" over an unpopular and nonconformist group. The police should not attempt to circumvent
the bounds of the Constitution in response to community pressures. In Wheeler,
excluding the vagrancy charges, no criminal activity was proved to have occurred
at the house. 298 F. Supp. at 937.
,Smith v. Hill, 285 F. Supp. 556, 562 (E.D.N.C. 1968).
" Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 620-21 (1968); Dowbrowski v. Pfister,

380 U.S. 479, 490 (1965).
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Johnson43

suggests that the nature of the enactment is more determinative in a decision whether to abstain than is just good or bad faith application. It is reasonable that a federal court should abstain when a
state statute appears constitutional on its face so that the issue becomes the
bad faith enforcement of a constitutional enactment. If the statute is
constitutional, then the state courts and possible appellate review in the
United States Supreme Court should be adequate to protect the accused's
rights. The alleged bad faith application is then in a sense irrelevant
because the problem is whether the accused committed a provable offense
under the statute.
In Dombrowski the Court held abstention improper because the
statute in question was vague and because
[T]he conduct charged in the indictment is not within the reach of
an acceptable limiting construction readily to be anticipated as the
result of a single criminal prosecution and is not the sort of "hardcore" conduct that would obviously be prohibited under any construc44
tion.
As was noted earlier, the primary problem with the vagrancy statute attacked in Wheeler is not its uncertainty of meaning but its overbroad
character. Abstention is improper unless the state statute is uncertain
45
but can be limited to a constitutional construction by state courts. If
the meaning of the vagrancy statute is certain, and it appears for the most
part that it is, then the only remaining problem is whether a state court
could give it a constitutional construction. The conclusion of the court in
Wheeler was that the state courts could not give the vagrancy statute a
constitutional construction. 46 It appears that even a narrowing construction of the statute would still leave significant questions as to its constitutionality.
The court in Wheeler, while determining that the vagrancy statute
was clearly defined, could have concluded that irreparable injury was
'1 390 U.S. 611 (1968). The Court said that bad faith application of a valid
statute was not established by the facts. However, the application of the Mis-

sissippi anti-picketing statute to Negro demonstrators protesting racial discrimination in voter registration suggests that the state did apply the statute to stifle
protest and not solely to protect access to the local courthouse. The court could
have found bad faith in the passage of the state statute after demonstrations began, and in its use to protect segregationist state policies. See id. at 620.
"380 U.S. at 491-92.
,Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251 n.14 (1967).
o298 F. Supp. at 941. Does the judge's decision on this point usurp the decision making process of the three-judge court? See note 19 and accompanying
text supra.
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shown because the delay in prosecution tended to suppress the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs to free association. If such a determination
had been made, even defense of the state criminal prosecution would not
suffice to protect the plaintiffs' first amendment rights. But the court,
relying on Dombrowski, concluded that the vagrancy statute is uncertain
in meaning and that its vagueness chills first amendment rights.47 The
court's reliance is misplaced because the weakness of the vagrancy statute
is not vagueness but overbreath; and unlike the type of enactment in
Dombrowski, the vagrancy statute on its face has nothing to do with
first amendment rights. Dombrowski's application is proper only to
enactments that on their face directly deal with first amendment rights
because it is the threat of the vague statute in relation to those rights
that is the basis of that decision.
The principles of Dombrowski cannot be invoked by the factors of
alleged vagueness and selective enforcement of the statute alone. Vague
state statutes call forth a basic abstention principle-to allow state courts
to construe them in a constitutional manner, if possible, prior to federal
court intervention. Only a statute that is both vague and that on its face
affects first amendment rights should be exempt from abstention. The
factor of selective enforcement of a vague statute actually supports abstention because such enforcement encourages the state courts to interpret
the enactment in question. Abstention applies more clearly where the
interpretation of state law is uncertain.4"
The court in Wheeler, while perhaps not applying the correct principles to difficult issues, illustrated that there can be federal relief for
substantial and systematic police harassment. This case involved the application of section 1983 to civil rights questions involving neither racial
discrimination nor a mass demonstration; such cases brought under this
statute are rare. The result of the relief granted in Wheeler for the nonstatutory constitutional deprivations could produce a new wave of jurisprudential problems 49 that may lead to narrower guidelines and limitations if more violent and politically-minded groups seek broad federal
protection against police activities."0
'8 298 F. Supp. at 941.

" Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965).
"'For a discussion of how a federal injunction could be used to control constitutional violations, see Note, Federal Injunctions as a Remedy for Unconslitutional Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 142 (1968).
"0Such protection could, of course, hamper legitimate police investigations if
the injunctions issued are as broad and comprehensive as the one in Wheeler. The
threat of contempt action against the police under such injunctions could be a
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Only the failure of state law enforcement bodies to observe federal
constitutional principles and the lack of faith in state court implementation of those principles are responsible for the continuing trend toward
federal intervention in civil rights cases such as Wheeler. State enforcement agencies should be better trained and better supervised to prevent
systematic unconstitutional police harassment. State courts and prosecutors both should be careful that procedural devices, such as the nolle
prosequi with leave, are not abused where there is a lack of evidence or a
desire to avoid a constitutional question. The proper forum for matters
of state criminal law enforcement and state criminal statutory interpretation is in the state courts rather than in the federal district courts. But
the principles of Dombrowski can be held to their narrowest construction
by the federal courts only if the states through their law enforcement and
judicial institutions provide adequate safeguards against the deprivation
of constitutional rights.
NORMAN E. SMITH

Income Tax-Tests under Section 117 for Exclusion of
Educational Grants
Section
from gross
Prior to its
educational

117 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for the exclusion
income of amounts received as scholarships or fellowships.'
enactment there was no specific statutory provision covering
stipends. Instead, the inquiry was "[w]hether such grants

. ..fell within the broad provision excluding from income amounts resignificant deterrent to effective police action. For a discussion of possible limitations on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions and the policy considerations behind such
limitations, see Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in tie Wake of Monroe
v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1486 (1969).
1 The section reads in part:

§ 117. Scholarships and fellowship grants.
(a) General rule-In the case of an individual, gross income does not in
clude(1) any amount received(A) as a scholarship at an educational institution (as defined in
section 151(e) (4)), or
(B) as a fellowship grant,
including the value of contributed services and accommodations; and
(2) any amount received to cover expenses for(A) travel,
(B) research,
(C) clerical help, or
(D) equipment,
which are incident to such a scholarship or to a fellowship grant, but
only to the extent that the amount is so expended by the recipient.

